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1  Introduction  
Behind-the-border reforms are critical to growth. Regulatory impediments to competition 
do not need to be explicitly discriminatory against foreigners in order to have the effect of 
raising the prices of goods or services above those in neighbouring countries. Such 
market segmentation violates the conditions for allocative efficiency and possibly also 
productive efficiency, and so reduces income levels.  
Accordingly, a process of ‘deep’ economic integration should target not just the 
inappropriate restrictions that explicitly discriminate against foreign suppliers, but also 
those that are not explicitly discriminatory, but nevertheless raise prices above those in 
neighbouring countries. Such a wide-ranging reform process, if pursued on a non-
preferential basis, would target all the inappropriate impediments to competition, and 
therefore likely have a significant impact on real incomes. 
Hence economic integration should not be an end in itself, but the outcome of domestic 
reforms that increase the general contestability of markets. By contrast, preferential 
trading agreements pursue economic integration as an end in itself. Recent PTAs have 
tended to target regulatory restrictions on a preferential basis, and partly as a result, they 
have tended to concentrate only on those regulatory restrictions that discriminate 
explicitly against foreigners. Dee (2005) shows that the gains from such PTAs are small 
compared to a moderately successful completion of the Doha Round. And they are trivial 
compared to a comprehensive program of unilateral regulatory reform, one that targets 
non-discriminatory behind-the-border restrictions on competition.  
However, such domestic regulatory reform is not easy, because of the diversity of 
economic interests involved. These include the interests of incumbent producers, 
potential foreign entrants, potential new domestic entrants, upstream supplying industries, 
downstream using industries, final consumers, and governments. The players are 
primarily domestic, so a necessary forum for managing the political debate is a domestic 
forum, not an international one (such as in trade negotiation).  
In order to improve growth outcomes to the maximum possible extent, it is therefore 
necessary to understand two things — what constitutes better domestic economic policies 
(and the institutions required to implement them), and what stops better policies being 
adopted domestically. The first can be called the static problem, and the second the 
dynamic problem, of domestic economic policy.  
Recognising that there are two types of policy problems means that there are two possible 
roles for institutions — institutions to implement better economic policies, and   2 
institutions to support the policy-making process. The first role supports solutions to the 
static problem, and the second  role supports solutions to the dynamic problem.  
2  The static policy problem 
Economists often take a static view of economic policy and institutions. They identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of current policy, and the institutions that implement it. They 
use economic theory to identify optimal policy, and institutions to implement it. And 
when the optimal is not attainable for various reasons, they identify better policy and 
institutions. 
An example can be drawn from the area of telecommunications. Many East Asian 
economies with a colonial background inherited a system where telecommunications 
services were provided by a government department (for example, the Department of 
Post and Telegraph), which was charged with meeting many competing objectives, but 
faced few economic disciplines. As a result, pricing structures were often the antithesis of 
those required for allocative efficiency, while cost structures were often far from 
productive efficiency. The policy was one of provision by a government monopoly. The 
institution to implement it was the Department of Post and Telegraph.  
Economic analysis has contributed greatly to understanding the regulatory issues 
associated with regulating infrastructure networks where some network elements (for 
example, the copper wire connection between subscribers and their nearest switching 
station — the so-called ‘last mile’) have the characteristics of a natural monopoly. The 
best policy settings in this context could involve encouraging full competition in all but 
the last mile, but regulating to ensure that the incumbent does not use its monopoly 
control over the last mile to thwart competition in other segments. This might require 
allowing competitors access to the last mile on a regulated basis. So the ‘best’ economic 
policy might be competition in all but the last mile. And the institutions required to 
implement this might include an independent regulator to oversee the access regime for 
the last mile.   
In some East Asian economies, such a regulatory outcome may be infeasible. Technical 
regulatory capacity may be lacking, or governance problems may make it difficult to 
ensure the true independence of a regulator. In either case, a policy that may promise a 
‘better’ outcome than the current policy may be to licence one or two new entrants, who 
may have to tolerate inflated costs of access to the incumbent’s network, but may still 
provide useful competition in retail telecommunications markets. If governance is weak, 
it may be wise to limit the discretionary power of the licensing agency to set licence 
conditions, so as to minimise the scope for corruption or political interference. A ‘better’ 
economic policy may be to license a fixed number of competitors. The institutions   3 
required to implement it may include a licensing agency administering licence conditions 
that are fixed in advance.  
What constitutes ‘best’ or ‘better’ economic policy may therefore depend on the level of 
a country’s economic development — there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all solution. 
So if countries need regional help in solving the static policy problem (that is, identifying 
better economic policy), that assistance will also need to be tailored to their particular 
circumstance. There may be some domestic policy problems that create international 
spillovers (for example, where energy networks extend across national boundaries), 
where policy solutions may require a single, coordinated regional approach. Otherwise, 
solutions will tend to vary from one country to the next.  
Arguably, however, there are not many instances where countries have few ideas about 
their own economic reform priorities, or their own reform options. This is because 
organisations such as the World Bank and the OECD have been highly effective in 
establishing regulatory benchmarks, such as through the OECD’s indicators of product 
market regulation and the World Bank’s questionnaires to assess services trade policy 
and performance. And regional organisations such as APEC have been highly effective 
forums for countries to compare experience about domestic reform options. Those at 
lower levels of development have been able to observe the experiences of the countries 
higher up the ladder, and so to develop a hierarchy of reform options for themselves as 
their economies grow.  
3  The dynamic policy problem 
The key dynamic problem is how to get from current policies (and institutions) to ‘better’ 
or ‘best’ policies (and institutions). This raises three subsidiary questions. 
•  What stops better policies being adopted?  
•  How does (or should) the policy-making process work?  
•  What institutions could help lead to better policy-making processes? 
There are three possible reasons why good microeconomic policy reforms are not 
adopted.1 Each has different implications for the type of institutional changes that could 
better support the reform process.   
•  Governments do not know what is regulatory ‘best (or better) practice’. This argues 
for external assistance to governments to provide the expertise to undertake 
systematic reviews of existing regulatory arrangements, and to evaluate regulatory 
alternatives. It also argues for an international exchange of regulatory experience to 
                                            
1 The following taxonomy is due to Ross Garnaut.   4 
raise awareness of what constitutes better practice, as has occurred to date through 
APEC.  
•  Governments know what is ‘better practice’, but face political resistance from vested 
interests. This argues for government-sponsored policy review institutions to help 
marshal countervailing interests. It also argues for an international exchange of 
experience about how to handle vested interests, and how to strengthen domestic 
institutions in favour of the public interest.  
•  Governments do not want good policy, because they rely on the rents from bad 
policies for political funding purposes. In these circumstances, government-sponsored 
transparency institutions will tend to be sidelined, as appears to have happened with 
the National Economic and Development Authority in the Philippines. However, 
there is a role for private (or otherwise independent) policy review institutions to 
carry out the necessary work of scrutiny, and to marshal countervailing interests.  
Thus in all cases there is a useful role for policy reviews, but the purpose of the reviews 
varies, depending on the nature of the problem. If the problem is one of identifying better 
policies, then policy reviews provide a technical solution — they can review current 
policy settings and identify better options. But if the problem is managing vested interests 
(which may include those within government), then policy reviews are a strategy rather 
than a technical solution — they can provide ammunition with which to manage vested 
interests and build a coalition in favour of reform, although there is no guarantee that they 
will be decisive in any particular instance. Over time, however, they can help influence 
the terms of the debate. Each of these roles for policy reviews is now discussed in turn.  
Policy reviews to identify better policy options 
The elements of a policy review are shown in Box 1.2 This assessment forces 
policymakers to work through a sequential process of articulating the problem, assessing 
a range of options and recommending the best option or explaining why some other 
option is recommended. The third element, setting out some viable options as to how the 
desired objectives might be achieved, prompts officials to work through all the 
possibilities on the regulatory spectrum. The fourth element, setting out the costs and 
benefits of each option for each stakeholder, and the overall effect on the community as a 
whole, can help to identify a preferred option. A full consultation process with all 
stakeholders can assist in identifying all the costs and benefits to each stakeholder. A 
strategy to implement the preferred option and then review its operation provides an ex 
post performance check.  
                                            
2 Parts of this section are taken from Coghlan (2000), PC (1998) and Banks (2003).   5 
Box 1  Elements of a policy review 
A policy review may set out 
•  The problem or circumstances which give rise to the need for action 
•  The desired objective(s) 
•  The options (regulatory and non-regulatory) that may constitute viable means for 
achieving the desired objective(s) 
•  An assessment of the impact (costs and benefits) on consumers, business, government 
and the community of each option 
•  A consultation statement (the process and results of consultation with all stakeholders) 
•  A recommended option 
•  A strategy to implement (including consideration of appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms) and review the preferred option 
For a policy review process to make a useful contribution, there needs to be an orderly 
policy development process, and the review needs to be done early enough to articulate 
viable options before positions become locked in. Quite often, policy making does not fit 
this model. Rather, policymaking often results from political imperatives calling for 
quick action, from deals with particular interest groups and from bargaining between 
political interests or parties. Sometimes these approaches result on good policy outcomes, 
but the risk of failing to do so is undoubtedly higher than in cases where a more open and 
orderly policy development process is adopted.  
Figure 1 shows such an open and orderly policy development process. The figure 
presupposes having certain institutions, or at least institutional divisions. However, an 
orderly policy development process does not depend on having those exact institutions — 
other institutions could perform the same functions, depending on the system of 
government. What is important is the functions themselves.  
At the very  end of the ideal process, a policy proposal is put to government by the 
responsible officials and Minister, and a decision is made as to the appropriate form of 
regulation or other policy action. In a parliamentary system, this decision is often made 
by Cabinet, a grouping of all government Ministers. When a Minister makes a 
submission to Cabinet, other Ministers can scrutinise the proposal, although this Cabinet 
scrutiny is typically not made public. In a presidential system, the decision may be made 
by the executive branch, with scrutiny only from within the presidential office.  
If the decision is to implement ‘black letter law’, then legislation will be drafted and 
tabled in the legislature. This allows for public debate and scrutiny by members of both 
the ruling government and opposition parties. If the decision is to institute lower level 
regulations of any sort, these will typically not be tabled in the legislature.     6 
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As noted, sometimes the policy development process does not work in an orderly fashion, 
and the above process is all that takes place, once a problem has been identified. In this 
case, there is very little scope for those other than the responsible Minister to have input 
into the decision-making process. And there is no public scrutiny, if at all, until after the 
decision is made.   
When the system works in an ideal fashion, a great deal of policy development work 
takes place before a proposal is put to government. This policy development process 
involves policy review, as outlined above. It also involves a great deal of consultation. 
Ideally, there would be two rounds of consultation with all relevant stakeholders, one at 
the inception of the review as the review panel or agency is starting to develop its ideas, 
and again after the preparation of a draft report that outlines the full analysis and possible 
regulatory solutions (sometimes, but not always, including a preferred solution at the 
draft stage). 
The opportunity provided by policy reviews for transparent consultation is the key to 
their strategic role in managing vested interests.   
Policy reviews to manage vested interests 
Independent policy reviews can help deal with vested interests in a number of ways. First, 
they can help set the agenda — policy change will not happen if nobody talks about it. 
Reviews can also set the parameters of the debate. The analysis in such reviews may be 
contested and thus controversial, but if it establishes a framework that takes into account 
consumer and other countervailing interests, it makes it much harder for these interests to 
be ignored. Reviews can also help to depoliticise a debate. And most governments will 
find it useful on occasion to take the heat off an issue by referring it for independent, 
objective study. Reviews can ‘name and shame’ the recipients of special deals. They can 
marshal countervailing interests, helping to build a coalition in favour of reform. They 
can identify policy combinations that lead to a so-called Pareto improvement, where at 
least some are better off and nobody is worse off. This helps to build a grand coalition for 
reform.  
Independent, transparent, economy-wide policy reviews have a role in helping to build a 
pro-reform consensus outside of government. But governments with an economic reform 
agenda also have to build consensus within government. Good processes of policy 
coordination are required to ensure that all relevant ministries are consulted. Mechanisms 
are also required to ensure that final decisions reflect the public interest, not just narrow 
sectional interests. One such mechanism is to provide the coordinating role to an agency 
that has broad, horizontal portfolio responsibilities, as has happened through the Council 
on Economic and Fiscal Policy in Japan. Arming such agencies with high-quality,   8 
independent policy reviews can also strengthen the public interest during the coordination 
process. Finally, mechanisms are required to ensure that coordinated decisions are abided 
by. A threat of budgetary sanction is one mechanism. Threat of exposure through ex post 
reviews is another. 
The characteristics of policy review institutions 
Keeping in mind the two possible roles of policy reviews, it is now possible to canvas the 
desirable characteristics of policy review institutions.3 There are three key attributes. 
•  Statutory independence.  The review agency should not be bound by current 
government policy, as line government departments often are. In conducting its 
reviews, it needs to be able to openly criticise current government regulatory 
initiatives, and government policy more broadly. The ability to provide a full critique 
of current regulation is a necessary first step in proposing regulatory reforms. The 
review agency may still be dependent on government funding — the critical point is 
that it not be constrained in criticising government policy. 
Further, the review agency should not have an implicit stake in the status quo, as 
regulatory agencies in charge of implementing current economic policy often do. At 
worst, such agencies may be captured by current vested interests. But even statutorily 
independent regulatory institutions can have a strong implicit stake in the regulatory 
status quo, as this is often required to implement current policy effectively. Ideally, 
therefore, a policy review agency should be independent of current regulatory 
agencies.   
•  An economy-wide view — the review agency needs to look beyond narrow sectional 
interests, and to consider net gains to the economy as a whole.  
•  Transparent processes — the review agency needs to ensure the transparency of the 
arguments and analysis put to it. It could do this, for example, by holding its 
consultations in the form of public hearings, or by publishing summaries of its 
consultations shortly afterwards. The agency’s reports to government should also be 
made public, ensuring the transparency of its own advice to government. Transparent 
processes bolster the ability of at least some countervailing interests to marshal 
against particular vested interests, so helping to ensure that an economy-wide view 
will be taken by policy makers. This can also relieve the government from having to 
marshal those countervailing interests itself.  
A requirement to take an economy-wide view is critical, and a requirement to consult 
widely is not enough, for two reasons. Without a requirement to take all views into 
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account, a review agency may simply ignore some views. More importantly, one key 
group of stakeholders — consumers — rarely participate in public consultation processes. 
In many countries, consumer interest groups are active on consumer safety issues, but 
rarely participate on matters of economic efficiency. Having a review agency required to 
take an economy-wide view ensures that consumer interests are taken into account, as 
well as the interests of producers and downstream using industries. This is better 
accomplished if the agency has the analytical resources, including skills in partial and 
general equilibrium modelling and cost benefit analysis, to estimate the gains or losses in 
consumer surplus as well as producer surplus from any reform initiative.  
Such an agency cannot possibly undertake the policy development for every single policy 
proposal. But it is particularly useful in those policy areas where there are major potential 
efficiency or other payoffs to the community from change, but where existing 
entitlements create resistance to reform. As noted, referring such issues to a statutorily 
independent body can help to de-politicise them, and allow breathing space for more 
careful analysis.  
The government need not be bound by the recommendations of such an agency. For 
example, in Australia the government quite frequently modifies aspects of the 
recommendations made by its policy review agency, the Productivity Commission, when 
implementing them, and occasionally rejects its recommendations in whole or in part. 
Indeed, this is the ‘other side of the coin’ to its statutory independence. Nevertheless, an 
agency can still have influence, even if it can be ignored, for several reasons: 
•  transparent processes have influence, and such an agency can ‘name and shame’ the 
beneficiaries of special-interest policy deals; and  
•  ideas have influence, and such an agency can present reform proposals with high-
quality intellectual backing.  
A policy review institution will be subject to inevitable attack from vested interests, and 
so needs to protect its credibility in the face of such attacks. Credibility is enhanced if the 
organisation has the resources to ensure that its analysis is of the highest quality. 
Credibility may also be enhanced if it can maintain the status of an ‘honest broker’, 
mediating among the special interests and making recommendations, but not becoming 
involved in the politics of the subsequent decision-making. If it is to remain ‘above the 
fray’, but if its ideas are to have influence, its ideas need to be championed, or at least 
debated, by others. Thus an educated and literate commentariat has an important role in 
adding credibility to an independent review institution. Alternatively, a review agency 
could credibly remain involved in the subsequent decision-making, so long as it had no 
clear conflict of interest. However, this involvement would divert resources from its 
review tasks. Finally, credibility can be built over time as each vested interest becomes   10
the beneficiary of some reforms, even though it loses from others. Thus, even vested 
interests can come to recognise that they have a stake in the long-term survival of a 
policy review institution.  
A statutorily independent review body is not the only type of organisation that could 
carry out the review and consultation phases of policy development. Government 
departments can develop their own consultation mechanisms, such as holding round-
tables of relevant stakeholders or asking for written submissions from interested parties, 
as input to their own policy development processes. Such consultations are facilitated by 
e-government initiatives, and may be effective in eliciting countervailing producer 
interests.  
Inter-departmental committee processes convened by a ‘central agency’ department (such 
as a Finance Ministry or Presidential office) can also bring a number of stakeholder 
interests to bear by proxy, through the representative departments. Inter-departmental 
processes can be important in themselves for ensuring policy coherence among the 
different departments, so long as the central coordinating agency has the authority to 
ensure that final committee decisions are honoured. Coordinating agencies that have 
control over the purse strings are generally in a strong position in this regard. So too are 
agencies that control access to leaders. The lack of interdepartmental coordination has 
been identified as a major cause of policy incoherence in Indonesia’s sugar trade policy 
(Stapleton 2006).  
However, neither departmental consultations or inter-departmental committees 
necessarily ensure that consumer interests are taken into account. Further, public 
consultation is often limited to the first round of consultation shown in Figure 1. Not 
often do government departments or inter-departmental committees circulate their own 
reform proposals for public comment once they have been tentatively formulated.   
Another type of review mechanism is to convene a review panel of eminent persons on a 
once-off basis to consider a particular issue. Such panels often rely on the integrity of 
individual appointees for their independence and impartiality. For example, appointees 
who come from an independent judicial background may maintain that independence in a 
review context, while more overtly ‘political’ appointees may be neither independent nor 
impartial. Such panels also depend for their effectiveness on their terms of reference, 
which may direct them to take a broad or narrow focus on a particular issue. And terms of 
reference that are tailor-made to a particular issue are more likely to be manipulated than 
policy guidelines that need to be applied across a whole range of issues. Resourcing such 
panels with a well-trained secretariat from the bureaucracy can provide the skills to carry 
out economy-wide analysis, but is not sufficient to ensure that it is actually carried out.    11
Finally, a bicameral system of government can sometimes provide one other important 
mechanism of policy review. Upper houses of government can sometimes instigate their 
own reviews of legislation before it is voted on in the upper house. The reviews may 
included public consultation, and may be a useful final screening mechanism. But they 
are typically highly charged politically, and occur too late in the policy development 
process to have a major influence on policy design.  
4  Ensuring better policy making processes  
To summarise, policy reviews can play two critical roles — they can provide a technical 
solution by helping to identify better policy options, and they can be part of a strategy to 
deal with vested interests, including those inside government. These dual roles suggest 
that there could be three key attributes of a policy review institution — statutory 
independence, an economy-wide view, and transparent processes.  
But which actual institutions in each economy do, or could, carry out such policy 
reviews? The answer is not straightforward. In the same way that no economy starts out 
with the best economic policies or supporting institutions, no economy starts out with the 
best policy-making institutions. Instead they inherit a set of policy-making processes that 
reflect their own unique history. So the answer may vary from economy to economy. In 
particular, the nature of the dynamic solution may depend on the nature of the dynamic 
problem.  
If the key problem is identifying better policy options, then policy reviews are a technical 
solution. A key consideration for any agency undertaking policy reviews is therefore its 
analytical capacity and an economy-wide view.  
If the key problem is managing vested interests, then policy reviews are a strategy rather 
than a technical solution. A key consideration for any agency undertaking policy reviews 
is therefore its independence, transparency, and credibility in the face of attack from 
vested interests. Credibility can in turn be cultivated and maintained by having a strong 
analytical capacity, although this is not the only strategy. A further consideration is 
whether the ruling government is itself a vested interest, and whether an appropriate 
review agency can be government-sponsored, or needs to be a private think-tank.  
The nature of the dynamic policy problem has varied around the East Asian region. So 
too has the institutional innovations in policy-making processes to correct it.   
One clear example is the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in Japan. This was an 
institutional innovation of the Koizumi government in Japan, designed primarily to deal 
with the predominance of vested interests in the previous policy making process. Key 
attributes of the Council are its transparency — summary minutes of Council meetings   12
are published within three days of Council meetings. This helps to expose, and therefore 
neutralise, the special pleading of business vested interests. As noted, another key 
attribute is the representation on the Council of government departments with broad 
portfolio responsibility. This helps to neutralise vested interests within the bureaucracy.  
The Council was not designed to provide a technical solution by identifying policy 
options. So to date, the Council has not commissioned or undertaken extensive policy 
reviews on its own initiative. However, Japan faces the challenge of ensuring that the 
Council’s role and influence survive beyond the Koizumi era. One strategy has been to 
involve the Council in medium-term economic planning, particularly in the area of fiscal 
policy. It is conceivable that initiating ex post reviews of recent policy reforms may also 
provide the Council with another longer-term role, also ensuring its ongoing relevance 
and usefulness.  
Although old-fashioned economic planning is now seen as outmoded in an era of open 
markets and outward-oriented growth strategies, a medium-term planning process can 
nevertheless provide a useful forum for detailed ex ante reviews of policy options. Such a 
medium-term focus can then bind successive governments and guard against excessive 
‘short-termism’ in policy development. Mid-term reviews carried out during the planning 
cycle can also provide an opportunity for ex post policy reviews. Thus a traditional 
planning process could potentially be transformed into a system of continuous rolling 
policy reviews, as occurs now in Australia. Indonesia’s BAPPENAS is a traditional 
planning agency with the technical expertise to undertake detailed policy reviews. 
However, it has not yet taken on a more pro-active policy review role. Malaysia is 
another economy in which the planning process could potentially be transformed into a 
process of critical ex ante and ex post policy reviews. Currently, however, its planning 
process seems more concerned with ensuring the smooth implementation of given 
policies, rather than with critical evaluation of those policies.     
China and Vietnam do not have democratic forms of government, but still face the 
problem of managing vested interests. Early in Vietnam’s transition to a market 
economy, many reforms were seen as clear Pareto improvements — with at least some 
clear winners, and with no clear losers. Now the government’s priority reforms are 
creating losers as well as winners, and policy implementation is more difficult, 
accordingly. One strategy that Vietnam has tried is a taskforce approach — putting 
together groups of experts from within and outside government to consider one particular 
area of reform. The approach has had mixed success. China, too, is at the stage where 
reforms are creating losers as well as winners, and so China requires new strategies to 
deal with vested interests. China, along with the Philippines and Indonesia, also has the 
problem of coordinating reforms among different levels of government.    13
Governments in all political systems require a mandate of some sort, but a key question is 
how that mandate is cultivated. At one extreme, a government could choose to implement 
an economic reform agenda in a ‘crash through or crash’ style — simply implementing 
reforms until the cumulative opposition from vested interests and/or public opinion 
erodes their legitimacy. Alternatively, they could attempt to influence the terms of the 
debate.  
A reform program that makes provision for independent policy reviews may be slower 
than a ‘crash through or crash’ program. But it is likely to be more sustainable in the 
longer term. This is because the reviews do not just identify reform options, they help 
‘sell’ them in the face of opposition from vested interests, overly simplistic public 
opinion and/or bureaucratic or Ministerial sabotage.  
5  How can regional processes help? 
Regional processes such as APEC could provide a range of assistance in conducting 
independent, transparent, economy-wide policy reviews — from marshalling external 
expertise for such reviews, to providing a forum for the exchange of experience about the 
conduct of such reviews. But if regional assistance is to be useful, it needs to help with 
the policy ‘selling’ function as much as with the policy identification function. 
Accordingly, regional assistance needs to be tapped into actual policy making processes, 
with mechanisms to ensure real contact with stakeholders (to manage diversity of opinion 
outside government), and real follow-up from Ministers and the bureaucracy (to manage 
diversity of opinion inside government).  
Giving regional assistance mechanisms a point of contact with responsible Ministers, and 
holding the responsible Ministers accountable for stakeholder contact and bureaucratic 
follow-up and Ministerial coordination, would be one way to ensure this. The particular 
Minister responsible would vary from one instance to the next, depending on the scope 
and subject matter of the review. But each Minister would be likely to welcome the 
opportunity, since they would benefit most from the chance to de-politicise sensitive or 
divisive issues by referring them for independent policy review.   
The APEC Economic Committee is one possible forum though which Ministers could 
identify the reform priorities for individual countries or groups of countries, and through 
which relevant Ministers could self-select for regional assistance in undertaking 
independent policy reviews. Regional assistance could be in the form of drawing up 
terms of reference for such reviews through an office associated with the Economic 
Committee, and marshalling the collective expertise available in independent think tanks 
and elsewhere around the region for undertaking such reviews. Ministers could usefully   14
also agree in advance that such reviews should follow standard policy guidelines of 
independence, transparency and an economy-wide view.  
The relevant Ministers would need to organise forums for contact with relevant 
stakeholders (including government departments) during the course of such reviews, to 
help marshal all points of view. It is an open question how many rounds of stakeholder 
meetings would be appropriate, but it is important that they be open to the public. It is 
also critical that the resulting review document be made public. This could be ensured by 
a policy guideline that required the responsible Minister to release the final document 
within a specified time of its completion. Finally, the responsible Minister should be 
required to have the review document given due consideration by all relevant Ministers 
with a country, also within a specified time frame. The lead Ministers could not be held 
accountable for the outcomes of that consideration, since that would be a matter for all 
Ministers. Nevertheless, a requirement to have the matter considered could provide the 
lead Ministers with a mandate for Ministerial coordination, where such mechanisms 
might be lacking at the moment.  
This method of organising regional assistance for independent policy reviews differs 
from one based on an OECD-style secretariat, essentially by putting lead Ministers in the 
driving seat, ensuring their ownership and accountability from the outset. This is critical, 
since the prime purpose of such reviews is not just the identification of ‘better practice’, 
but also the selling of it domestically. An office of some sort would still be required to 
service the process, through writing terms of reference, commissioning the services of 
independent researchers to undertake reviews, providing intellectual leadership and 
guidance for such reviews, and perhaps assisting the lead Minister to organise 
stakeholder consultation and Ministerial follow-up (where their own bureaucratic 
resources for such efforts were scarce). But the process would be under the guidance of 
the APEC Economic Committee and the lead Ministers themselves.  
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